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ESSAY
The End of Copyright*
David Nimmer**
a. CHIMES FROM TRADE WINDS
One December 8, 1994, Congress ended the experiment that it
commenced on May 31, 1790, in the first Judiciary Act:' legislating
an autonomous body of United States copyright law governed by the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.2 We witnessed, on December 8,
a major change of constitutional proportions; even more significantly,
we experienced the first tremors of certain tectonic shifts in United
States sovereignty; and, perhaps most significantly, we undertook a
sea change in defining the end that copyright serves, the identity of
the master in the copyright sphere.
I refer to enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(the "Act").3 That enactment, one must hasten to add, represents a
major overhaul of federal law in many spheres, not simply in copy-
right.4 I cannot hope to cover the alpha and omega of this massive
* This Essay was delivered as the keynote address at UCLA's entertainment sympo-
sium, Where Worlds Collide (February 10, 1995). © 1995 by David Nimmer.
** A.B. 1977, Stanford University; J.D. 1980, Yale University. Of Counsel, Irell & Man-
ella, Los Angeles, California.
1. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
2. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
3. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
4. Matters addressed range from textile trans-shipment to cheese and chocolate crumb
importation to excess pension assets used for retiree health benefits. Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act, S. Rep. No. 103-412, 1O3d Cong., 2d Sess. 123, 127, 148 (1994) ("Senate Report").
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law. But its copyright significance more than amply warrants mo-
nopolization of this Essay's attention.
Copyright has now entered the world of international trade.5
The popular press mirrors this phenomenon6-never before has copy-
right monopolized the headlines in any way comparable to the recent
spate of stories about plans for the United States to impose
$1.08 billion in punitive tariffs on goods from the People's Republic of
China because of copyright violations7 Twenty-nine factories operat-
ing in southern and central China, some under government auspices,
produce some 70 million pirated laser discs and audio compact discs
annually.8 The United States threatened to respond by imposing
tariffs on China.9 Furthermore, the United States threatened to bar
China, because of its copyright piracy, from entry as a charter
member of the World Trade Organization, constituted on January 1,
1995.10
It is appropriate that the roots of this Essay, detailing the end
of the expansive perspective of traditional copyright protection, ger-
minated at a Hollywood entertainment seminar entitled Where
Worlds Collide;" even more apropos might have been Where Worlds
Implode. Physicists posit a universe expanding ever since the Big
Bang;12 but one view holds that at some future point the mutual at-
traction of every particle in the universe will overcome that expan-
5. In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement implementation bill, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), contained two copyright provisions, although their import was
drastically circumscribed. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 18.07 (Matthew Bender, forthcoming
Dec. 1995). For the prior history of copyright in the international trade sphere, see generally id.
§§ 18.01-.06.
6. See, for example, Reuter World Service (Jan. 5-7, 1995).
7. Prior to the delivery of the speech on which this Essay is based, for example, the lead
headline of the Los Angeles Times for Sunday, February 5, 1995, introduced a story on Chinese
copyright piracy and U.S. trade retaliation. Ronald Brownstein and Rone Tempest, U.S. Plans
China Trade Sanctions, LA. Times Al (Feb. 5,1995).
8. Id.
9. Id. Even the monologue on NBC's 'Tonight Show" took note, with host Jay Leno
commenting "Thousands of people get run over in Tiananmen Square by tanks-no problem.
But bootleg a copy of 'Ernest Goes to Jail,' and that's it-send in the troops." Daniel Williams,
China Finds "Comprehensive Engagement" Hard to Grasp, Washington Post A17 (Feb. 13,
1995).
10. U.S. Business Delegation Lashes Beijing Over Copyright, Agence France Presse (Jan.
20, 1995) (referring to a statement by Jay Berman, Chairman of the Recording Industry of
America). Later, the United States made good on its threat. Jeffrey Parker, Wary China Signs
Anti-Piracy Trade Pact with U.S., Reuter World Service (March 11, 1995).
11. See note *. The subject matter of that conference dealt with "convergence" issues,
whereby Hollywood concerns intersect with those of Silicon Valley, and technology blurs the
traditional distinctions between differing species of media.
12. John D. Barrow, The Origin of the Universe 11-18 (Basic Books, 1994).
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sion.13 Time will then run backward and all matter will contract to-
ward the Big Crunch.14 December 8, 1994, may be viewed in
hindsight as that turning point in the legal universe. Under this
view, time is now running backward, and all legal doctrines are
collapsing into the gigantic crunch of trade law.
P. FouR SEASONS
The bold thesis of this Essay, positing the end of traditional
copyright jurisprudence, obtains notwithstanding a paucity of legal
provisions actually legislated as part of the Act. Congress enacted
just four copyright provisions on December 8, 1994.15 To appreciate
the import of these four provisions, the discussion below first summa-
rizes them briefly. It then takes a step back to survey their larger
framework, before examining them in more detail and inquiring as to
their constitutional underpinnings. Only after such an analysis can
we then draw conclusions.
The first of the four copyright provisions is extremely simple.
According to the rules of world trade now in effect,16 countries are
obligated to bar the rental of three types of copyrightable goods:
software, sound recordings, 17 and cinematographic works. The first
provision of the Act simply makes permanent the bar on rental of
computer software,1 which in 1990 had been implemented on an in-
terim basis.19 This amendment dovetails with a parallel extension
implemented exactly one year earlier, pursuant to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ('NAFTA") accords, converting the interim
13. Id. at 29.
14. One of the world's most eminent physicists concluded early in his career that "[pleople
in the contracting phase would live their lives backward: they would die before they were born
and get younger as the universe contracted." Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 150
(Bantam Books, 1988). Later, he recanted. Id. at 151.
15. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 501, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973 (1994).
16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPs"), Arts.
11, 14(4), reprinted in 33 Intl. Legal Mat. 1197, 1201-02 (1994).
17. For nations, unlike the United States, that have in force as of April 15, 1994, "a sys-
tem of equitable remuneration of right holders in respect of the rental of phonograms," the
pertinent protocol allows such systems to continue, "provided that commercial rental of phono-
grams is not giving rise to the material impairment of the exclusive rights of reproduction of
right holders." TRIPs, Art. 14(4) (cited in note 16). This grandfather provision countenances
the Japanese system. Ralph Oman, Berne Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 Fordham Intell.
Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 139, 144 (1993) (calling the exemption "a necessary evil').
18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 511, 108 Stat. at 4974.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994 ed.).
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ban on rental of sound recordings (first passed by Congress in 1984)20
into a permanent feature of United States copyright law. 21
So much for software and sound recordings-what of the third
category of works as to which the world trade order bans rental, i.e.,
movies? That rental prohibition is subject to an exception when such
rentals do not materially impair exclusive rights of reproduction of
such movies.22 Because of that exception, Congress has not mandated
the closure of all video and laser disc rental stores in this country.
The next two provisions of the Act affect performance rights.23
When a singer or an orchestra performs at a concert hall, what is
transpiring differs from a fixed sound recording that can be purchased
at a record store.24 Protection for the performance in the United
States typically has been conceptualized as arising under state law,25
rather than under federal law.26  But, since December 8, 1994, live
performances are for the first time protected under Title 17 of the
United States Code.27 This anti-bootlegging right applies whether the
subject at hand is a Grateful Dead concert,28 Esa-Pekka Salonen, or
even a music video of the Concertgebouw Orchestra.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994 ed.).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994 ed.).
22. TRIPs, Art. 11 (cited in note 16). See J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the
GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Inte-
grated World Market, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 171, 216 n.175 (1993)
(noting that this provision "introduces a trade law concept like that of 'material injury' into
intellectual property law for the first time"); Oman, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L.
J. at 144 (cited in note 17) (calling the provision "probably impossible to enforce").
23. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §§ 512-13, 108 Stat. at 4974.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1988 ed.) (describing the scope of copyright protection as
including "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
25. Such matters are discussed in 1 Nimmer on Copyright §§ 1.01[B][3][bJ, 1.08[C][2], 2.02
(Matthew Bender, 1994). Some cases are collected at id. § 1.08[C][2] n.39, including the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(upholding Ohio's right to protect a daredevil's performance).
26. Without pretending to have undertaken any sort of scientific survey, a throw-away
line in the legislative history states: "Although current State laws and judicial decisions provide
some protection, these new provisions will provide uniform Federal enforcement." Senate
Report at 225 (cited in note 4). The Statement of Administrative Action is to the same effect.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade
Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and
Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 992 (1994) ("SAA"). It
does, however, add the insightful point that such state laws "may not provide the necessary
basis for border enforcement against bootleg sound recordings." Id.
27. Uruguay Round Agreements Act §§ 512-13, 108 Stat. at 4974.
28. I have shared the dais at many a multimedia conference with John Perry Barlow,
lyricist for the Grateful Dead and retired Wyoming cattle rancher, as well as sometime copy-
right commentator. See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethink-
ing Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property
is Wrong), Wired 84 (March, 1994).
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The fourth and final provision of the Act restores copyright
protection to durationally eligible2 9 works of foreign origin that cur-
rently languish in the United States public domain.3o This Essay
explores that subject matter in more detail below.
y. GATT AND ALL THAT
So why all the sturm und drang, if these four relatively cir-
cumscribed amendments constitute the sum and substance of the new
law? To appreciate the new era that we have entered requires some
knowledge of its" greater context. The four copyright provisions ap-
pear in Title V of the Act, which generally addresses intellectual
property and effectuates changes to the trademark and patent arena
as well.31 Title V itself is a minor facet of the Act; in fact, it does not
even register on the radar screen of the section-by-section commen-
tary in the House and Senate Reports for this massive law.32
Before grappling with the Act, however, we need to take a
further step backward and look at the underlying Uruguay Round
Agreements. Incident to the debate over the Act, the news media
reported numerous stories about the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GAIT").83 Historically, amendments to GATT have been
29. By "durationally eligible," the intent is to refer to works for which the maximum
conceivable term of protection has not yet expired. To illustrate, a work first published in 1935
enjoys a maximum term under United States copyright law until 2010, assuming all formal and
other hurdles have been vaulted. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994 ed.) (extending the duration of
copyright protection in certain cases). Nonetheless, particular works published in 1935 may
have entered the United States public domain promptly upon publication in 1935 because of
invalid national status, in 1942 because of republication then without proper copyright notice, or
in 1963 upon failure to secure appropriate renewal, to name three contingencies. In each of
these cases, protection for the work has lapsed, notwithstanding that the work is still
durationally eligible for protection.
30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 108 Stat. at 4976.
31. Id. at 4973.
32. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
("House Report"); Senate Report (cited in note 4).
33. See, for example, Richard Alm, U.S. Cracking Down on Intellectual Piracy, Dallas
Morning News ID (Feb. 13, 1995); James 0. Goldsborough, Trade Dispute With China Shows
the Value of an Idea, San Diego Union-Tribune B7 (Feb. 13, 1995); Sheila Tefft, U.S., China
Trade Clash Worsens, Christian Science Monitor 9 (Jan. 3, 1995).
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called "negotiating rounds. '34 The just-completed round commenced
in 1986 at Punta del Este, Uruguay, whence its name.3 5
The United States wanted to broaden the Uruguay Round to
include services such as investments; govern previously unregulated
industries, such as agriculture; and, for the first time in the trade
context, mandate standards for intellectual property.8  Congress
authorized the President to negotiate a deal, giving him a deadline of
December 15, 1993.37 Naturally, the United States Trade Repre-
sentative went right down to that wire.38
Given the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, appended to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,39 it should be noted
34. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection in
Friedrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker, eds., GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the Interna-
tional Protection of Intellectual Property 99 (VCH, 1989) (providing a history of GATT); Anna
M6rner, The GATT Uruguay Round and Copyright, 25 Copyright Bulletin 7, 8 (No. 2, 1991)
(providing a brief history of GATT); Marshall A. Leafier, Protecting United States Intellectual
Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 298 (1991) (providing a
background and overview of GATT).
35. See note 34.
36. See generally A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in
Services in the Uruguay Round. Laying the Foundations, 23 Stanford J. Intl. L. 57 (1987);
GAIT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 2d Sess 34 (1994) ("Committee Hearings'
(the U.S. Trade Representative praised "landmark protection" for intellectual property, "our
fastest growing industry in the country).
37. Pub. L. No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239 (1993).
38. Presidential Memorandum, Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67263, 67264 (Dec. 20, 1993). There was a flurry
of stories around that date about how Hollywood "lost" the negotiations. There is some truth to
that assessment. See id. at 67267. The Europeans were allowed to continue to prop up their
domestic film industries under an exception to Annex 1B to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The Europeans were
also allowed to place domestic quotas on television broadcasts. See id. Both of these non-tariff
impediments to international trade are vexing to the copyright industries, as they may lessen
the exploitation of works of U.S.-origin within Europe, and hence cut into the projected revenue
stream. Nonetheless, these glitches do not detract from the legal accomplishments in the pure
copyright sphere; for such exploitation as does take place must still be subject to scrupulous
observance of all copyright norms. According to President Clinton, "we can best advance the
interests of our entertainment industry by reserving all our legal rights to respond to policies
that discriminate in these areas." Id.
39. Reprinted in 33 Intl. Legal Mat. 1125 (1994). The structure of the compact is as fol-
lows. First comes a one-page Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations. Id. at 1143. Next is the nine-page Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement"). Id. at 1144. The main substance is then con-
tained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement: Annex 1A is the Multilateral Agreement on
Trade in Goods, comprised of the GATT 1994 plus twelve other agreements, id. at 1154; Annex
1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), id. at 1167; Annex 1C is TRIPs
(cited in note 16), the subject matter of this Essay, id. at 1197; Annex 2 is the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), also discussed herein, id.
at 1226-47; Annex 3 is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, providing for periodic review of
members' trade policies, see id. at 1153; and Annex 4 contains Plurilateral Trade Agreements
1390
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that the terminology "GATT" is now pass6. 40  Instead, the World
Trade Organization ('AVTO") replaces the GATT secretariat and ad-
ministers the brave new world of trade.41 On April 15, 1994, in Mar-
rakesh, Morocco, 111 nations signed that Final Act.42 One may thus
posit that April 15 is destined to become the most holy day of the year
for internationalists. For those who stand at the opposite end of the
spectrum, the "giant sucking sound" 43 affecting everything from copy-
right to United States sovereignty will long resonate as an echo of
that day.44
5. STRANGE TRIPs
The great legal accomplishment in international copyright of
the Uruguay Round Agreements is called the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, abbreviated by the
acronym 'TRIPs. '45 The United States was the guiding force behind
the adoption of TRIPs.46 It is the highest expression to date of binding
regarding Government Procurement, Civil Aircraft, Dairy, and Bovine Meat, see id. (In contrast
to multilateral agreements, which bind all Members, plurilateral agreements apply to a subset
of members who have accepted them). See Amelia Porges, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Trade Negotiations-Introductory Note, 33 Intl. Legal Mat. 1125, 1126 (1994) ("Introductory
Note"). At the end are appended an assortment of ministerial decisions and declarations, such
as the special provisions for least developed countries. See Senate Report at 3-4 (cited in note 4)
(giving an overview of the many agreements which comprise the Uruguay Round Final Act).
40. There is a GATT 1994 (consisting simply of GATT 1947 with two brief pages of
amendments added on), but that instrument occupies part of Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement
(cited in note 39). GATT 1994 governs tariffs and the like; copyright exists in a completely
separate sphere, namely Annex 1C. TRIPs (cited in note 16). In this particular instance, the
worlds do not collide.
41. 58 Fed. Reg. at 67293 (cited in note 38) ("[t]he organization would not be different in
character from that of the existing GATT' Secretariat, however, nor is it expected to be a larger,
more costly, organization"). The WTO "encompasses the existing GAT institutional structure
and extends it to the new Uruguay Round disciplines on services, intellectual property, and
investment." House Report at 12 (cited in note 32).
42. Senate Report at 5 (cited in note 4). Note that the authoritative Marrakesh text
supersedes the earlier Geneva language. Id. at 3. See Introductory Note at 1126 (cited in note
39) (discussing the process of legal rectification of 26,228 pages of treaty text). On the
rectification of TRIPs, see id. at 1128.
43. Opposing U.S. accession to NAFTA, Ross Perot coined this colorful term to predict a
massive loss in U.S. jobs to Mexican industry. Given that "GATT is like 123 NAFTA's," House
Debate at H11452 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Manzullo, Ill.), by the time debate over
GATT adherence came before Congress, the phrase had already become commonplace. For
examples of its use, see Committee Hearings at 8, 57, 87 (cited in note 36).
44. Any connection between tax protesters who wail about checks due the IRS on that day
and opponents of the holy order of trade must await exploration in a future monograph.
45. See note 16.
46. On early efforts to introduce intellectual property into the GATT framework, see A.
Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay
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intellectual property law in the international arena. In many ways,
TRIPs is a convention to honor the Great Conventions governing
intellectual property that stem largely from the 19th Century.47 For
instance, all WTO members must follow the Berne Convention in the
sphere of copyright (except for its moral rights provision), the Paris
Convention in the patent sphere, the Washington Treaty on Intellec-
tual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, and the Rome Con-
vention for performances and neighboring rights.48 The United States
already adheres to the Paris and Berne Conventions, but surprisingly
not to the Washington Treaty or the Rome Convention for neighboring
rights.49
But TRIPs goes beyond incorporation. It contains its own
elaborate recitation of minimum rights and standards.50 In addition,
its most unique innovation in the law of international trade
concerning intellectual property is that it has enforcement
mechanisms. Indeed, it embodies "trade with teeth.51 (But along
with bite, as we shall see, comes the potential for backbite.52)
E. PREVENTiVE DENTISTRY
The need for these enforcement mechanisms arises because of
Conventional failures. The United States joined the Berne
Convention with much fanfare in 1989.53 China has also belonged to
the Berne Convention since 1992.M One could therefore conclude, on
paper, that there is no copyright problem between these two
Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 Stanford J. Intl. L. 57, 64-65 (1987). By 1988, TRIPs had
become one of three "must-have" items in GATT revision for the United States. Bruce H.
Turnbull, Intellectual Property and GATT: TRIPS at the Midterm, J. Proprietary Rights 9, 10
(March, 1989).
47. 'Each WTO member country is required to apply the substantive obligations of the
world's most important intellectual property conventions, supplement those conventions with
substantial additional protection, and ensure that critical enforcement procedures will be
available in each member country to safeguard intellectual property rights." Senate Report at
224 (cited in note 4).
48. See TRIPs, Art. 1(3) (cited in note 16).
49. See Marshall A. Leaffer, ed., International Treaties on Intellectual Property at 456
(BNA Books, 1990) (Washington Treaty signatories); id. at 416 (Rome Convention signatories).
50. TRIPs, Arts. 1-14 (cited in note 16).
51. One observer compares the new WTO to a saber-tooth tiger. Committee Hearings at
371 (cited in note 36) (remarks of Ralph Nader). See also note 63 (discussing the enforcement
measures of TRIPs).
52. See Part X (arguing that copyright law has been subsumed within the law of trade).
53. Irvin Molotsky, Senate Approves Joining Copyright Convention, New York Times C5
(Oct. 21, 1988).
54. 6 Nimmer on Copyright App. 20 (Matthew Bender, 1994).
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nations-because the United States and China are both Berne
Convention signatories, copyright must be effectively protected in
both places. But that conclusion is in error: the Achilles' heel of all
the Great Conventions is that they uniformly lack enforcement tools.55
Imagine a film company that is perturbed by the production in
China of pirated laser discs of its latest release. There is no private
right of action under the Berne Convention.56 Therefore, its only
remedy is to go to the United States State Department to ask the
government to file suit against the People's Republic of China before
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). How many copyright cases
have been brought in The Hague? A grand total of zero.57
Even if such a case were brought, and even if it were won, the
ICJ can only enforce a judgment in China if China accedes to it, or
with the aid of the United Nations Security Council.58 Therefore, the
whole enterprise of enforcement under the Berne Convention is effec-
tively pointless.
Copyright has thus migrated from the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"), which administers the Berne
Convention, to the World Trade Organization. 59 The purpose of the
emigration is to grant enforcement mechanisms-de facto protection,
rather than de jure protection that is ultimately unenforceable.
C. DE JURE IS OUT
In the most honest sense, who cares about de jure protection?
Imagine that China reacted to the pressure brought by Jack Valenti of
55. Some have derided the Berne Convention's dispute settlement mechanisms as
"effectively worthless." Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off.
Soc'y 121, 131 (1994); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 275-76, 294, 300-02 (1991).
56. Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works: 1886-1986 at 906 (Center for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 1987).
57. Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 Fordharn
Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 267, 270 (1993); Cordray, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off.
Socy. at 131 (cited in note 55) (arguing that nobody would ever sue in The Hague "because the
sued state would interpret the action as an unfriendly act").
58. Cordray, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off. Socy. at 132 (cited in note 55).
59. Relative to TRIPs, WIPO eventually conceded that it had "neither the funds nor the
mandate from its members to consider the issue." Id. at 141. See Lisa Barons, Note, Amending
Section 337 to Obtain GATT Consistency and Retain Border Protection, 22 L. & Policy in Int'l
Bus. 289, 310 (1991) ("Directors-General of the GATT and WIPO agreed that 'there were nojurisdictional reasons not to proceed' with intellectual property negotiations in the GATT');
Anna Mbrner, The GATT Uruguay Round and Copyright, 25 Copyright Bulletin 7, 9 (No. 2,
1991) (discussing the various reasons why copyright issues were addressed by GATT rather
than WIPO).
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the Motion Picture Association of America and Jason Berman of the
Recording Industry Association of Americao by announcing: 'We will
shut down all twenty-nine illicit factories and we will even execute
copyright pirates.6 1 But the cost is that we will remove from our
statute books the very sophisticated copyright laws that currently
exist." Would the United States balk at such an arrangement? It
reminds me of the joke where the Hollywood agent meets with the
Devil, who promises, 'You can have sex, power, money, and
success-just sign on the dotted line and give me your immortal soul."
The agent replies, "Okay-but what's the catch?" I think the United
States Trade Representative would have said something similar:
"What's the catch?" De jure protection is not really the goal here.
It could be that domestic industries in China and in other
countries may desire copyright statutes on the books to foster their
own creativity in nascent industries.62 But from a trade perspective,
Americans do not care much about the legal rights that exist abroad
so much as the practical protection that they receive abroad.
Thus we have a whole new world order. TRIPs itself includes
an unprecedented armamentarium for a copyright compact. 63 Its
provisions include injunctions and damages, seizure and interdiction
60. Both gentlemen attended talks in China leading to the abortive trade war discussed in
notes 7-10 and accompanying text. China Piracy Targeted, Daily Variety 23 (Jan. 19, 1995). In
addition, both gave testimony at a congressional hearing that considered a predecessor bill.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions, Joint
Hearing on H.R.4894 and S.2368 before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
225, 258 (1994) ("Joint Hearings").
61. Simultaneous with official denunciations of U.S. one-sidedness in the incipient Sino-
American trade war, the People's Daily reported that an Intermediate People's Court in south-
eastern China sentenced an individual to life imprisonment for pirating 689,000 copies of
several different book titles. China Warns U.S. "Stands to Lose" in Any Trade War, Deutsche
Press-Agentur (Jan. 9, 1995). In a similar vein, the London-based International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry announced that China had agreed to the anti-piracy step of tagging
the molds for all legitimate compact discs pressed in that country. Organization Cites China
Piracy Progress, Daily Variety 34 (Jan. 9, 1995).
62. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 273, 282-83 (1991) (describing a change in
attitudes among developing nations that are beginning to see the benefits of strong copyright
protection).
63. Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off. Socy. 121, 135
(1994) (calling enforcement provisions "the most significant milestone in TRIPs"); Ralph Oman,
Berne Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 139, 144
(1993) (observing that TRIPs "puts teeth into the economic obligations of the Berne Convention.
That bare fact is an immense achievement"). Given the high level of de jure copyright
protection in most countries of the world, the problems facing copyright proprietors prior to
TRIPs was "inadequate enforcement rather than a lack of substantive protection." Leaffer, 76
Iowa L. Rev. at 287 (cited in note 62).
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at the border, right down to mandated discovery devices to force
infringers to finger their suppliers, criminal penalties, and a host of
other provisions.64
I. THE DSU OF THE WTO
All these various fingers fit into the larger glove of the WTO.
Moving from Annex 1C (TRIPs) to the WTO Agreement, Annex 2
consists of an Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU").65 Eighteen pages of minute regula-
tions binding all WTO members now govern disputes in the world of
copyright trade (as well as other trade).66
To draw a practical example, imagine a music company, ag-
grieved over pirated audiocassettes being sold in Thailand. The object
here is practical relief. The music company does not really care if
Thailand has an autonomous copyright law, if it adheres to the Berne
Convention, or if its judges simply issue rulings ad hoc based on what
they ate for breakfast that morning. The point is that the plaintiff
wants effective relief, and it wants that relief expeditiously and eco-
nomically. If the Thai courts do not grant that relief for whatever
reason, we have a trade problem.
In the past, there has been no relief from such problems, as
copyright was not part of the historic GATT. Therefore, if Thailand
violated United States copyrights, the United States could respond by
saying, 'Thailand, unless you get your act in order, we in the United
States will give no more copyright protection to Thai music!" That
response, of course, was not terribly frightening ('"WVhat's the catch?"
64. TRIPs, Arts. 42-46, 59-61 (cited in note 16).
65. 'The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system." DSU, Art. 3(2) (cited in note 39). The
U.S. Trade Representative had labeled the old system "one of the major shortcomings of the
GATT" and declared that its reform was of "immense importance" to the United States. J. H.
Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT
Connection, 22 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 747, 760 n.36 (1989).
66. See Committee Hearings at 35 (cited in note 36) (statement by the U.S. Trade
representative calling DSU "a critical element in this Uruguay Round"). In 21 articles and four
appendices, the DSU is nearly as long as the entire TRIPs annex. Of course, it applies across
the board to trade disputes, and has no special application to copyright-or even more generally,
intellectual property--disputes. DSU, Art. 1(1) (cited in note 39). Nonetheless, it should be
noted that an instance of infringement of an obligation under TRIPs "is considered prima facie
to constitute a case of nullification or impairment," meaning that it presumptively exerts an
adverse impact on other members. Id. at Art. 3(8).
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again comes to mind as a riposte).67 On the other hand, if the United
States retaliated by slapping a tariff on the importation of jade from
Thailand, then the United States would have been considered a viola-
tor of the world trade order of the GATT that then governed. 8 Under
that old framework, the United States would have been an outlaw
and Thailand would not have been a violator. 69
Annex 2 introduces the innovation of international panels to
hear complaints about, for example, copyright violations.70 Let us
imagine that in the WTO framework a dispute arises between the
United States and Korea over American movies. Three judges might
be chosen to adjudicate that dispute-a judge from Denmark, one
from Ghana, and one from Peru.71 Of course, no Americans or Kore-
ans would be permitted on the panel72 Following the detailed eviden-
tiary and procedural rules contained in Annex 2, the panel would
issue a timely report.73 The losing party could then appeal that judg-
ment to the WTO's standing Appellate Body.7 4 At the end of the day,
justice should emerge relatively quickly.
67. Thus, whereas threats against Brazilian software are inefficacious to induce Brazil to
protect U.S. software, threats against Brazilian export of coffee or rubber footwear may produce
"an entirely different dynamic." Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual
Property, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 267, 271 (1993).
68. Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off. Soc'y 121, 134
(1994). "Imposing a sanction for not having adequate intellectual property laws is not a justifi-
cation that is accepted in the GATT-it is a violation of the GATT." Id. at 134 n.58. See Reich-
man, 22 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. at 888-89 (cited in note 65) (arguing that industrialized nations
cannot expect developing nations to obey international intellectual property law unless they,
too, obey such laws).
69. Lisa Barons, Note, Amending Section 337 to Obtain GATT Consistency and Retain
Border Protection, 22 L. & Policy in Intl. Bus. 289, 308-09 (1991). Note the dilemma from
operating in a world trade scheme that excludes intellectual property: "the United States is
perceived to be violating the GATT when it attempts to act within the void left by the GATT and
protect intellectual property rights by imposing regulations allegedly in violation of the GATT."
Id.
70. The old GATT panel dispute mechanism had become "notorious for interminable
hearings and extreme politicalization by member countries." Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting
United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 Iowa L. Rev.
273, 301 (1991). It also suffered from the fatal flaw that any country-even the offending
party-could block adoption of a panel report. Cordray, 76 J. Patent & Trademark Off. Socy. at
133 (cited in note 68). The new order hopefully remedies that defect: "Most significantly, a
losing party can no longer block a panel report under the Draft Final Act-a report is adopted
unless all parties agree that it should not be adopted." Id. at 135.
71. DSU, Art. 8(5) (cited in note 39).
72. Id. at Art. 8(3).
73. On panel procedures, see id., Art. 12, App. 3. On the applicable timetable, including a
detailed breakdown of steps that should occur over 30 weeks, see id., App. 3(12). When multiple
complaints apply, see id., Art. 9. For intervention by third parties, see id., Art. 10.
74. The Appellate Body is composed of seven persons "of recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise," of whom three serve in any given case. Id. at Arts. 17(1), 17(3). On
appellate procedures, see id. at Art. 17(9).
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The key innovation here is the permissibility of cross-sectoral
retaliation.75 Thus, if the United States wins and Korea is adjudged a
copyright violator, then Korea must proceed to honor copyrights in the
American movies. If it does not do so, the United States is permitted
to slap a punitive tariff on the importation of Hyundais from Korea.76
Unlike the old scenario concerning importation of Thai jade, this is
now a perfectly permissible trade action.77
The hope at the end of the day-and the reason that the
United States so fervently pushed for both TRIPs and a dispute set-
tlement mechanism-is that there should be effective relief for Ameri-
cans. No longer will we be at the mercy of unclear local statutes. Nor
will it be availing for some country to tell us they have antiquated
language in their copyright act; they are obligated under TRIPs to
give effective relief to United States copyrights. No longer may they
plead the excuse of an inefficient court system; it does not matter if it
takes ten years to go to trial in India, for, under the WTO Agreement,
India is obligated to protect American copyrights effectively. Nor does
it matter if we are dealing with a bribe-prone culture or a law that is
not up to snuffts-the result is what counts, and the WTO is designed
to produce results.
0. PARSING THE AMENDMENTS
With the above background in mind, we can take a deeper look
at the Act. Its first salient feature is that it is exactly that-an act,
75. Presidential Memordandum, Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67263, 67293 (Dec. 20, 1993). Effort should be
made initially to retaliate within the same sector. Id. at Art. 22(3)(a) (cited in note 39). If
impractical, successive broadening of the retaliation is permitted. Id. at Art. 22(3). With re-
spect to TRIPs explicitly, see id. at Arts. 22(3)(f)(ii), 22(3)(g)(iii). Complaints about the magni-
tude of retaliation are subject to arbitration. Id. at Art. 22(6).
76. 58 Fed. Reg. at 67292 (cited in note 75). See House Report at 15 (cited in note 32)
(stating that the new agreement establishes "time limits for country conformity with panel
rulings and recommendations and authorization of retaliation if such limits are not met').
77. J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 Fordham Intell.
Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 171, 262 (1993); Joel R. Reidenberg, Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA, 4
Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 283, 284 (1993); Anna M6rner, The GATT Uruguay
Round and Copyright, 25 Copyright Bulletin 7, 9 (No. 2, 1991).
78. Traditional problems stemmed from such factors as cultural predilections towards
bribery to idiosyncratic evidentiary requirements-that a movie's star, for instance, travel to a
distant land to conclude a video piracy case. Simon, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L.
J. at 276 (cited in note 67).
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and not a treaty.7 9 One can read floor statements from the House and
the Senate quoting Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard8 and others
to the effect that the new world order of trade should be presented to
the Senate for ratification.81 Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration
decided that an authorization statute sufficed and that there was no
need to present any treaty to the Senate for ratification.82
The four copyright features of the Act emanate directly from
the Uruguay Round Agreements. The United States, of course, is
obligated to follow the standards set forth thereunder no less than
Korea, Thailand, India, Denmark, and every other adhering country.83
More specifically, the copyright amendments are rooted in the need
for TRIPs conformity, so that the United States is not hauled before a
WTO panel and found to be in violation.
A. Bootlegging Parsifal et al.
Regarding the Act's provisions, the two major changes are anti-
bootlegging and restoration of foreign works from the United States
public domain. Anti-bootlegging is set forth in a simple provision.84 It
provides that one who makes a fixation or a broadcast without per-
79. Notwithstanding longstanding U.S. participation in the GATT, historically it was
never presented for Senate ratification. Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Consti-
tutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 896-97 n.441 (1995).
80. For a detailed rejection of Professor Tribe, see id. at 917-25, 923-24 n.517 (lt seems
wiser to refuse Professor Tribe's offer of instruction in advanced tea-leaf reading"). The return
broadside against those authors is set forth in Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
1223 (1995).
81. Consideration of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R.5110, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 27, 1994), in 140 Cong. Rec. S15302, S15303 (Dec. 1, 1994) ("Senate Debate") (remarks of
Sen. Kempthorne, Idaho) (quoting a letter from Professor Tribe to President Clinton). See
Consideration of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R.5110, 103d Cong, 2d Sess. (Sept. 27,
1994), in 140 Cong. Rec. H11454 (Nov. 29, 1994) ("House Debate") (remarks of Rep. Burton,
Ind.) (paraphrasing Bruce Fine of the Reagan Administration as to the possibility that GATT
violates Article II, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution).
82. Tribe, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 1234 n.47 (cited in note 80). For ruminations on the
constitutional explosions that would follow hypothetical judicial rejection of that conclusion, see
Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv. L. Rev. at 925-29 (cited in note 79). For instance, given the
manner of implementation of the Bretton Woods Agreements, U.S. membership in the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund would be called into question. Id. at 922 n.516. See
Senate Debate at S15296 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini, Ariz.) (suggesting that
the breakdown of GATT would bring a "chaotic system which, I fear, would bring international
economic growth to a grinding halt").
83. One should note, in addition, that large-scale intellectual property violations are not
limited to the Third World; the phenomenon is rampant in Europe, and in the United States as
well. See J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks
ofa GATT Connection, 22 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 747, 755, 769 n.80 (1989).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994 ed.).
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mission of the performer is subject to copyright-like liability.85 The
same is true for those who copy that work and who otherwise traffic
in it.86 Besides civil liability, criminal penalties are provided in the
new law as well.87
This new provision has been implemented because TRIPs re-
quires compliance with the Rome Convention on neighboring rights,
notwithstanding that United States law does not embody the distinc-
tion between droits d'auteur and droits voisins88 that led other coun-
tries to adopt the Rome Convention rationale and notwithstanding
that the United States itself does not adhere to the Rome Convention
for precisely that reason. 9 Whether we adhere or not, we are obli-
gated under TRIPs to give protection according to Rome Convention
norms.90 For that reason, Congress amended our law.
An example of a violation of this new provision would be an
unauthorized broadcast of the Three Tenors Concert from Dodger
Stadium, for example, or a do-it-yourself music video of a Sin4ad
O'Connor concert recorded with a VCR camera. The provision of the
law is so simple, however, and the langiiage that Congress legislated
so spare, that most questions one could ask are simply not addressed
in its implementation.
A few examples: first, the statute is apparently retroactive.
"Apparently" because the statute does not explicitly address this
seemingly vital issue.91 The language is broad enough, however, to
encompass retroactive protection.92 Therefore, one who has been
selling a bootleg Sinatra or Elvis performance for years and who con-
tinues to sell it after December 8, 1994, is now perhaps a felon. The
statutory protection, as well as being possibly retroactive, apparently
85. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 ed.).
88. These French terms refer to "author's rights" and to "neighboring rights." 2 Nimmer
on Copyright § 8E.01[A] (Matthew Bender, forthcoming Dec. 1995). In brief, works of high
authorship-novels, for example-find protection under the former, whereas products of less
genius-photographs, for example-are protected under some systems pursuant to the latter
regime. Id.
89. See note 49.
90. TRIPs, Arts. 1(3), 14(6) (cited in note 16).
91. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 8E.03[C[21 (cited in note 88) (discussing the statute's
application to prior recordings).
92. The amendment applies to "any act or acts that occur on or after the date of the
enactment," December 8, 1994. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(c). Any distribution after that date is action-
able if the subject phonorecord is "as described in paragraph (1)" defining unauthorized acts. 17
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). That first paragraph in turn applies to all unauthorized fixations of live
musical performances, without any prospective limitation. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1).
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lasts forever-no ending date is specified.93 Combining retroactivity
and perpetuality yields some curious results. Let us say that for the
last seventy-two years you have been selling a century-old Enrico
Caruso recording made without the great tenor's consent. If you
continue to sell it today, you are in apparent violation of the law.94
What we have here, unfortunately, is an instance of very sloppy draft-
ing.9 5
A few more questions: no statute of limitations is included.96
In fact, the section of the Copyright Act embodying the statute of
limitations was specifically excluded from incorporation in the anti-
bootlegging provision.97 There is also no incorporation of the work-for-
hire doctrine.98 So query whether one must get permission while
recording the Los Angeles Philharmonic from the second bassoonist,
and whether failure to do so makes one a bootlegger?99 There is also
no explicit fair use defense to protect First Amendment concerns. 10
93. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1101.
94. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 8E.03[Cl[3] (cited in note 88) ("Soothsayers are as
well equipped as punctilious music practitioners to answer that question, given no hint of a
solution from the legislature'.
95. Perhaps Congress felt bootlegging so odious that its stigma should endure forever, and
no quarter should be shown even to reliance parties trafficking in ancient Caruso recordings.
On the other hand, interpreting the legislation in light of its underlying TRIPs and Rome
Convention rationale, there is no need for protection beyond fifty years. See id. at § 8E.02.
Moreover, application of Article 18 of the Berne Convention mutatis mutandis to this realm
counsels mightily towards granting such reliance parties a reasonable sell-off period. Id.
Compare the solicitude for reliance parties in the retroactivity provisions of the Act. 17 U.S.C. §
104A(c) (1994 ed.). See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 9A.04[C] (cited in note 88) (discussing the
recent phenomenon of Congress's rescuing works from the public domain in the interest of
promoting free trade).
The problem with the former interpretation is that moral condemnations are absent from
the legislative history, as is almost everything else. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 18.06[C[2][b]
(Matthew Bender, forthcoming Dec. 1995) ("What is surprising... is not the relative dearth of
commentary concerning implementation of TRIPs into U.S. law, but its almost complete
absence"). The problem with the latter is that Congress expressly wished to disavow any direct
reliance on instruments of the Uruguay Round Agreements, such as the TRIPs annex, limiting
interpretation to the face of its own enactment and the SAA. See also note 26 (providing
additional commentaries). Because each of those commentaries neglects the instant question,
one is left guessing. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 8E.03[C][5] (cited in note 88) (discussing
difficulties in interpreting the statute).
96. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 8E.03[C][4].
97. The Act subjects bootleggers "to the remedies provided in sections 502 through 505, to
the same extent as an infringer of copyright." 17 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(3). The civil statute of
limitations is set forth in section 507. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1994 ed.).
98. The work-for-hire doctrine is set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994 ed.). It also is not
incorporated in the language quoted in note 97 above.
99. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 8E.03[A][3] (cited in note 88) ("Taping with due
permission solely from the impresario or conductor risks liability to [the other] performers).
100. One of the rare instances of legislative history addresses this matter: "It is intended
that the legislation will not apply in cases where First Amendment principles are implicated,
such as where small portions of an unauthorized fixation of a sound recording are used without
permission in a news broadcast or for other purposes of comment or criticism." Senate Report
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Finally, in general, the antibootlegging provision has been added to
Title 17, but not incorporated into the flow of that Title. 10' The
application of virtually every doctrine of copyright law is thus up in
the air at present. Much confusion reigns.
B. The Flying Dutchman
Turning from anti-bootlegging to the other major provision of
the Act, namely, recapture from the public domain, we confront a
most elaborate technical amendment. Instead of saying too little,
Congress went to the other extreme and added what might currently
be the longest section of the United States Copyright Act.
1. Copyrights Undead
In brief, the recapture provision implements, on a belated
basis, Article 18 of the Berne Convention. Article 18 requires newly
adhering states, such as the United States in 1989, to recognize the
copyrights of other Berne signatories that are still protected in their
home countries.10 2 Simplifying a bit, an example would be the case of
the Egyptian Nobel Prize winner, Naguib Mahfouz.' 03 Prior to Berne
adherence in 1989, the United States did not have copyright relations
with Egypt.104 Hence, his published works were in the United States
public domain, while still protected in Egypt. 10 5  When the United
States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, Article 18 required her to
accord recognition to such works as The Thief and the Dogs
and Wedding Song.06  Did the United States do that in
at 225 (cited in note 4). That statement is made following a comment on the criminal bootleg-
ging provisions, id.; but a parallel statement in the SAA expressly applies it to the civil realm as
well. SAA at 992 (cited in note 26). Unfortunately, these valuable precatory statements appear
unconnected to any precise statutory language.
101. See 2Nimmeron Copyright at § 8E.03[B][2][a] (cited in note 88).
102. "[T]o exclude retroactivity altogether will work harshly against the foreign author, and
deprive the new convention of much of its raison d'itre." Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986 at 666 (Center for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary College, 1987).
103. The discussion in this subsection draws from David Nimmer, Nation, Duration,
Violation, Harmonization: An International Copyright Proposal for the United States, 55 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 211, 229 (Spring, 1992).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 230.
106. Id. at 229-30. The views of the commentators fall into three classes-(1) actual prac-
tice of Berne Convention adherents allows outright abrogation of the retroactivity principle; (2)
a reasonable application of Article 18(1) requires protection for at least some pre-existing works;
and (3) lack of compliance with Article 18(1) may be excused to the extent needed to safeguard
those who detrimentally relied on the public domain status of particular works. Final Report of
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1989?17 The answer is "no."10 The United States explicitly
declined to recognize the works of Mahfouz and other works that were
in the public domain, 0 9 but promised to look at the question again~11
"Again" arrived in 1994. We are now making amends. Mah-
fouz's oeuvre is being restored to United States copyright protection in
toto. The effective date of that restoration is the effective date of
TRIPs with respect to the United States."' What is that date? Unfor-
tunately, it is still clouded in mystery. The United States Copyright
Office has indicated that the pertinent date is January 1, 1996.112
the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. &
Arts 513, 593 (1986).
107. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1988) (acknowledging that "a number of foreign experts expressed the view
that some degree of retroactive protection for works in the public domain for reasons other than
expiration of term was desirable at least as a matter of the 'spirit' of Article 18").
108. Id. at 52; Nimmer, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 229-30 (cited in note 103). See Final
Report, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts at 592 (cited in note 106) (conceding that "some have
informally suggested that the history of the Berne Convention and the at least implicit focus of
international agreements on the protection of published works do not support this theory" of
non-resurrection). The relevant balance to be struck here is between local (i.e., American)
industries that have arisen in reliance on given works being in the public domain within its
territory (i.e., the United States) and foreign authors whom the Convention is designed to
protect. See Copyright Amendments Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1990) (describing that Act as "an important balancing of interests'.
109. "[Thought must be given to those who have, quite properly, taken steps to exploit
these works and who would be financially embarrassed, to say the least, if the authors suddenly
acquired exclusive rights to control what they had been freely doing (publishing, performing,
adapting, etc.)" World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention 101
(1978). See Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 Fordham
Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 267, 280 (1993) (discussing the constitutional and political
issues that arise when re-establishing protection of works currently in the United States' public
domain).
110. H.R. Rep. No. 100-609 at 52 (cited in note 107).
111. The statute refers to "the date on which the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
enters into force with respect to the United States." 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (1994 ed.). Sec-
tion 101(d)(15), in turn, provides that Congress explicitly approves not only the WTO Agreement
but its TRIPs protocol.
112. Copyright Office, Copyright Restoration of Certain Berne and WTO Works, 60 Fed.
Reg. 7793, 7794 (Feb. 9, 1995). The Copyright Office notes that "the Justice Department predi-
cated its memorandum to the General Counsel to the United States Trade Representative as to
the constitutionality of the restoration provisions on the date of restoration being January 1,
1996." Id. (citing Christopher Shroeder, Memorandum to Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel,
USTR, Whether Certain Copyright Provisions in the Draft Legislation to Implement the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Would Constitute a Taking Under the Fifth
Amendment (July 29, 1994)). Mr. Schroeder's Memorandum addressed, not the bill that became
the Act, but an earlier Senate bill, S.2368. See Joint Hearings at 149 (cited in note 60)
(including a statement by Mr. Schroeder to the effect that statutory damages will be available
only from the year 2000 onward, a characterization that accurately reflected the Senate bill
then pending, id. at 27, but not Section 104A as ultimately enacted). See 2 Nimmer on
Copyright § 9A.04[B][1][b] (Matthew Bender, forthcoming Dec. 1995) (discussing the effective
date of TRIPs); Joint Hearings at 141 (including Ira S. Shapiro's statement that "[t]he Office of
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President Clinton has also issued a proclamation alighting on that
date." 3 Notwithstanding those heavy hitters, my own reading of the
statute points towards January 1, 1995.'1 Suffice it to say that Egyp-
tian works and countless other works either already have been or
soon will be rescued from limbo and restored to United States copy-
right protection.
It bears emphasis that the grounds of loss of protection are
irrelevant. Some works are currently in the United States public
domain because of ineligible national status." 5 Mahfouz is an exam-
ple of that phenomenon.116 But other works of foreign provenance are
in the United States public domain today for various other
reasons-for instance, works that were not timely renewed twenty-
eight years following publication.1 7  Other works might be in the
public domain because of notice defects or because of the
manufacturing clause.11 The reason does not matter. Come one,
come all-regardless of reason, all of G-d's children are equal in the
kingdom of heaven, and resurrection is liberally dispensed by this
amendment.
It must be added, however, that some works are actually more
equal than others because foreigners are benefited over Americans
with respect to the current amendments (and, by the way, Article 18
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice has submitted for the record, an analysis of the 5th
Amendment aspects of S.2368").
113. Presidential Proclamation, To Implement Certain Provisions of Trade Agreements
Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and for Other Purposes,
60 Fed. Reg. 15845 (March 27, 1995).
114. The clearest indication comes from the Schroeder Memorandum itself, which underlay
the Copyright Office's conclusion. See note 112. The bill construed in that memo, S.2368,
contained an express definition: 'The term 'TRIPs effective date' is the date upon which the
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property become
effective with respect to the United States." Joint Hearings at 35 (cited in note 60). Because
the obligations of TRIPs do not kick in until one year after it enters into force, Mr. Schroeder
accurately interpreted that bill to restore copyrights as of January 1, 1996. See TRIPs, Art. 65
(cited in note 16) (stating that TRIPs does not go into effect until "the expiry of a general period
of one year following the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement"). But because the law
as enacted no longer uses the bill's reference to "obligations" and simply refers to the date that
TRIPs "enters into force," the amended language points unambiguously (even if foolishly for the
policy reasons adduced by the Copyright Office) to January 1, 1995. See Norman J. Singer, 2A
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.18 (CBC, 5th ed. 1992) ("Adoption of an amendment is
evidence that the legislature intends to change the provisions of the original bill.' As to the
proclamation, the President manifestly lacks power to delay for one year implementation of a
law duly enacted by Congress (which, in this instance, the President himself had previously
signed into law).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6).
116. 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 9A.02[A][1] (cited note 112).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6).
118. Id. See also 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 9A.02[A][2] (cited in note 112) (discussing
formal defects which might result in a work's being in the public domain).
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of the Berne Convention is completely consistent with that implemen-
tation). If a studio forgot to renew its 1962 movie on a timely basis in
1990, that movie remains in the public domain today if it is of Ameri-
can origin. On the other hand, if that movie is of Berne Convention
origin-a French movie, for example, first published in France or
Germany-then the movie is rescued and either now has or shortly
will have a new United States copyright term, lasting until the end of
its term of protection, i.e., seventy-five years from publication in 1962,
if it was a work for hire.119
A song from 1952 that was published without a copyright no-
tice is governed by the same consideration. It is either in the public
domain if it is an American song, or it is protected if it hails from a
Berne Convention or WTO member country.120 Consider a sound re-
cording from before February 15, 1972, the date on which Congress
first extended prospective protection to sound recordings.121 If you
own an early sound recording by Everett Dirksen, that work has al-
ways been in the federal public domain and will stay in the United
States public domain for copyright purposes. A different result, how-
ever, is implemented if you happen to own a 1963 sound recording by
Boris Yeltsin, because those works that are definitionally ineligible
for copyright protection if of United States origin have now been given
a new full copyright term if they are of foreign origin. Even a seventy-
four-year-old sound recording is thus eligible for one more year of
federal protection.
2. Walpurgisnacht
This change, of course, creates myriad issues and questions,
which is why the recapture provision is so lengthy. Addressing only a
few of these issues, consider first warranties and undertakings.
Imagine that you represented and warranted that a given work did
not inf-inge a United States copyright. Now that same work does
infringe the copyright. Congress forgives you. You benefit by a spe-
cial provision that says you are not held to that representation and
warranty122
119. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(3) ('The term 'eligible country' means a nation, other than the
United States, that is a WTO member country, adheres to the Berne Convention, or is subject to
a proclamation under section 104A(g)"). Note in addition that nations may qualify for protection
via Presidential proclamation. 2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 9A.04[A][3] (cited in note 112).
121. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(f)(1) (1994 ed.):
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Imagine that you agreed several years ago to perform a given
public domain work during 1996. Now that work is newly infringing.
You are released from that obligation by special Congressional dis-
pensation.12 3
Combining the two releases into a nightmare scenario, one
could imagine a deal undertaken in 1993, whereby X pays Y $3
million for the privilege of screening on national television in 1996
motion picture F, Y representing and warranting that F does not
infringe any United States copyright. Based on that warranty, X
could pay network Z $2 million to screen F ten times during 1996.
For its $5 million investment, X might be confident of being able to
realize $10 million in advertising revenue. But with the resurrection
of copyrights under the Act, publicly performing F may now constitute
copyright infringement.124 Z may thereupon decline to screen F,
meaning that X will ultimately realize exactly zero revenue. Does Y,
now released from its representations and warranties, need to repay
X the $3 million for which they constituted consideration? Does Z,
now released from its performance obligations, need to repay X the $2
million for which they constituted consideration? In one of many
"slight" oversights, Congress forgot to say.125
3. G6tterddmmerung
Imagine a movie-whether vintage 1934 or produced in
1994-with a song of foreign origin on its soundtrack or based on a
Any person who warrants, promises or guarantees that a work does not violate an ex-
clusive right granted in section 106 shall not be liable for legal, equitable, arbitral, or
administrative relief if the warranty, promise, or guarantee is breached by virtue of the
restoration of copyright under this section, if such warranty, promise, or guarantee is
made before January 1, 1995.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(f)(2) provides:
No person shall be required to perform any act if such performance is made infringing
by virtue of the restoration of copyright under the provisions of this section, if the
obligation to perform was undertaken before January 1, 1995.
124. Perhaps F was in the U.S. public domain in 1993 and X paid Y for access to the only
celluloid print extant. Alternatively, this scenario could unfold if, as in the following subsection,
F consists of a movie protected by copyright, based on a public domain story of foreign origin,
the copyright to which is resurrected under the Act. See note 133 (discussing infringing
conduct).
125. The Act does not address the issue; the House Report and Senate Report have nothing
to say on the subject; the SAA is similarly mute; and all the floor statements that I have re-
viewed similarly ignore it. Although a hearing on a predecessor bill to the Act did ventilate
constitutional issues under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as to reliance parties in
general, Joint Hearings at 145-86 (cited in note 60) (including the testimony and statements of
Christopher Schroeder and Eugene Volokh), even those analyses ignore the "takings" (or due
process and contract impairment) implications of these two releases, notwithstanding that they
formed part of S.2368 then under review. Id. at 30.
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foreign short story. The song may have lapsed into the public domain
when synchronized, but be protected today (or no later than January
1, 1996). What is the legal status of the movie under the Act? Sev-
eral basic choices were available to Congress in the abstract. Under
the statutory termination-of-transfers provision that Congress passed
in 1976, someone who executes a termination of transfer gets the
rights back in the work;126 nonetheless, the owner of a derivative work
(say a movie based on the song following termination of rights in the
song) is still permitted to continue to exploit that work (the movie)
with little restraint.127 That is one model.
On the other hand, we have a very different model coming out
of the 1909 Act 28 renewal provisions when there has been a reversion
of renewal rights in a work, such as happened to the movie Rear
Window in Stewart v. Abend.29 In that situation, if rights in the song
or the short story have lapsed, then continuing exploitation of the
movie incorporating the song or the short story-continued exploi-
tation of the derivative work-constitutes copyright infringement
subject to damages.30 According to the Ninth Circuit in thp Abend
case, however, an injunction would be denied in that particular in-
stance.13' The Supreme Court let that ruling stand without address-
ing the issue of remedies.132
For this third instantiation of the same question, Congress had
a choice. It could have provided, parallel to termination of transfers,
for continued exploitation of the derivative work; alternatively, it
could have followed the Abend scenario and adopted a provision that
would make continued use infringing (albeit not subject to injunction,
126. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (1994 ed.).
127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) ("A derivative work prepared under authority of the
grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its
termination').
128. The current Copyright Act, codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, was enacted
in 1976. The predecessor Act, which then occupied Title 17, was passed in 1909.
129. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
130. Id. at 235-36.
131. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988). A previous Ninth Circuit
case had suggested that the district court could, on remand, consider using the same rationale
to resolve a difficult issue of relief. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659
F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417, (1984). Both Ninth Circuit
opinions cited to Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that an injunction could be denied
notwithstanding liability. 863 F.2d at 1479; 659 F.2d at 976.
132. In fact, the Court went out of its way twice to sidestep the issue. 495 U.S. at 216, 235-
36. Previously, the Universal City Studios dissenters had approved the imposition of damages.
464 U.S. at 499-500. Finally, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 n.10
(1994) (citing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479), a unanimous Supreme
Court approved the imposition of damages rather than an injunction. Note that the SAA
interpreting the Act likewise cites to that footnote in Campbell. SAA at 998 (cited in note 26).
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pursuant to the pure Ninth Circuit model). In the Act, Congress basi-
cally chose the latter option. In line with Abend, continued exploita-
tion following restoration of copyright in a formerly public domain
song now requires payment, but no injunction by congressional man-
date. 133 Thus, an action can be brought today'3 in United States Dis-
trict Court. Judge Hauk, the judge in the Central District of Califor-
nia who presided over the trial in Abend, might draw this new venting
of the same underlying issues. For this new case, Congress has
directed Judge Hauk to consider various factors, including the
"relative contributions of expression of the author of the restored work
and the reliance party to the derivative work.' 135  Under that
language, more payment should be accruing to the owner of the short
story on which a movie is based than to the owner of a song used for
five minutes on the soundtrack, for example.13 6
t. LIFE IN THE FAST TRACK
We have now taken a very brief look at the provisions of the
Act. Procedurally, its most salient feature is that it was implemented
on a fast-track basis.137 After the Act was introduced on Septem-
ber 27, 1994, Congress promptly adjourned for its midterm election
133. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A) (1994 ed.). Query whether the subject conduct should not be
called infringing, notwithstanding that it is subject to damages. The statute states that the
affected reliance party "may continue to exploit that work for the duration of the restored
copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the restored copyright reasonable
compensation for conduct which would be subject to a remedy for infringement but for the
provisions of this paragraph." Id. Arguably, this status is tantamount to a compulsory license
pursuant to a court-determined royalty. On the other hand, the statute's reference to
"infringement" makes the contrary interpretation equally plausible. Certainly Z could not be
faulted for interpreting F to be infringing in the second hypothetical posited in note 124.
134. Or following January 1, 1996, depending on the effective date discussed above in notes
111-14 and accompanying text.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(B). "In some cases, the harm to the actual or potential market
of the restored work will exceed the revenue generated by the exploitation of the derivative
work. Subsection (d)(3) is not intended to limit compensation due to the owner of a restored
copyright in such cases." SAA at 997 (cited in note 26).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(B). Without offering any support, the SAA predicts that "it is
likely that the owner of the restored copyright and the reliance party will agree on the amount
of compensation to be paid." SAA at 997 (cited in note 26). From my experience, that prediction
is naive-when no money is at stake, the parties' dispute may be bridgeable, but when a
successful work is at issue, the opposite dynamic will typically prevail.
137. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1994 ed.); Senate Report at 4 (cited in note 4); House Report at 19
(cited in note 32). Fast track procedures provide that any member of Congress "may move to
consider an implementing bill, and the motion to proceed to consideration is highly privileged,
unamendable and not debatable." H.R. Rep. No. 103-128, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993). For a
discussion of the constitutional dimensions of this procedure, see Bruce Ackerman and David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 904-07 (1995).
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campaigns. When passed in December by a largely lame duck Con-
gress,138 not one comma was altered.
Notwithstanding that copyright and even GATT was not fore-
most on the minds of the members of Congress during a tumultuous
election period, 13 9 both the House and the Senate managed to issue
lengthy reports on the Act.40 Those reports contain virtually nothing
about copyright and the matters treated in this Essay. 4' The Clinton
Administration conveyed a 2,800-page Statement of Administrative
Action ("SAA")42 to Congress to accompany the introduction of the
Act, and Congress adopted it as quasi-legislative history.143 The
lengthy SAA incorporates few pages explicating the copyright
provisions.'"
i. CONSTITUTIONAL MODULATIONS
In a federal system based on delegated powers, it is invariably
important to inquire after the constitutional basis for any piece of
legislation. In that regard, it is most instructive to scrutinize the Act,
as well as its House Report, Senate Report, and the Administration's
SAA. In the aggregate, the way that these voluminous materials ad-
138. Passage of the bill should not be mistaken for universal satisfaction with its contours,
or of the fast-track procedure. It was claimed variously that President Clinton "abused his fast
track authority" by making a "power play" to a lame duck session, including in the bill "payoffs
and sweetheart deals" not required by GATT. See House Debate at H11456 (cited in note 81)
(remarks of Rep. Rohrabacher, Calif.) ("[Congress] should have second thoughts about treating
in our foreign trade policies monstrous Nazi and communist-type regimes with other democratic
societies'). See Senate Debate at S15298 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Gramm, Texas) ("I
believe that in the process that the Clinton administration has probably killed the fast-track
process as we know it'.
139. House Debate at Hi1454 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Burton, Ind.) (betting that
not more than 20 out of 435 members of the House had even read the bin).
140. See Senate Report (cited in note 4); House Report (cited in note 32). The point is that
the copyright implications of the bill were lost in the shuffle, not that Congress failed to realize
the momentous impact of the bill. See House Debate at H11455 (cited in note 81) (remarks of
Rep. Burton, Ind.) (calling GATT "the most important piece of trade legislation in the history of
the world).
141. Agreement could not even emerge over how long the bill was. See House Debate at
H11454 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Gibbons, Fla.) (443 pages); id. (remarks of Rep.
Burton, Ind.) (800 pages); Senate Debate at S15294 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Nickles,
Okla.) (over 600 pages).
142. See note 26..
143. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4819 (1994).
According to the Senate Report, Congress decided not to legislate concerning certain matters,
but instead to effectuate them through administrative action under the SAA. Senate Report at
4-6 (cited in note 4).
144. See SAA at 991-99 (cited in note 26).
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dress the issue of constitutionality is: not.145 One seeks in vain for
evidence that anyone in Washington even considered the
constitutional basis for these vitally important amendments to United
States copyright law.16 We are therefore relegated to our own devices
to try to find a vehicle to justify the recent amendments.
A. Command Performance
With our ears attuned to constitutional frequencies, let us
examine the anti-bootlegging provision that now protects unfixed
performances. All previous enactments under Title 17 have been
grounded in the Copyright and Patent Clause of the United States
Constitution.47 One basic bedrock provision in the interpretation of
that clause has been that its reference to 'Writings" denotes
fixation.4 8  In other words, "Writings" may be a broad term that
embraces sculptures, maybe player piano rolls,4 possibly even mask
works for semiconductor chips etched in silicon.1 0 But no respectable
interpretation of the word "Writings" embraces an untaped
performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall. Because that
singer at Carnegie Hall is now clothed with protection under Title 17,
it must be concluded that this amendment is not rooted in the
Copyright Clause.
Consider an alternative: The Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution exalts treaties as binding laws1' and also gives
Congress the authority to enact whatever necessary and proper provi-
145. Virtually the only exception is the solicitude for First Amendment concerns in the
bootlegging context. See note 100. In addition, lengthy debate attended the question whether
the Senate needed to ratify a treaty, or the Uruguay Round Agreements could be presented as a
congressional/executive agreement. See Committee Hearings at 285 (cited in note 36). But that
discussion is, of course, far afield from pure copyright concerns.
146. In conjunction with the predecessor bill, there was discussion of the Takings Clause,
see note 125, and Professor Perlmutter discussed its Copyright Clause grounding. Joint Hear-
ings at 187-213 (cited in note 60) (including the statement of Shira Perlmutter).
147. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.09 (Matthew Bender, 1994).
148. Id. at § 1.08[C][21 ("A work is not written if it is not recorded in some manner'.
149. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo, Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that
"[a]s the act of Congress now stands," player piano rolls are not protected). Note that current
law effectively rejects the construction of that case. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 ed.) (extending
copyright protection to "original works of authorhip fixed in any tangible medium of expresison,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device'.
150. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1994 ed.) ("Chapter 9-Protection of Semiconductor Chip
Products'). Note that Congress took care to ground this enactment in the Copyright Clause,
and also inserted Commerce Clause grounding as a prudent back-up. 2 Nimmer on Copyright §
8A.02[B] (Matthew Bender, 1994).
151. U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 2 ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land").
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sions are required to carry out its enumerated powers. 152  Those
provisions furnish no help here-the United States never adhered to
the Rome Convention, which serves as the benchmark for the anti-
bootlegging provision. And what about TRIPs and the WTO
Agreement? As noted above, because the Clinton Administration
believed that the authorization statute was enough, no treaty was
ever presented to the Senate. 153
As a residual basis, one can always look to the Commerce
Clause.'" The impetus for the United States to join the World Trade
Organization came, of course, from the world of trade. Presumably, it
is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority to implement trade
agreements. 55 Notwithstanding that the anti-bootlegging provision
unquestionably violates Copyright Clause authority, let us assume for
the moment that it falls within Commerce Clause authority.
B. After the Fat Lady Has Already Sung
Turning now to resurrection of works from the public domain,
similar challenges arise. The Copyright Clause, besides being limited
to the writings of authors, also authorizes legislation only for "limited
[t]imes.' ' 5 Those limited times have now expired. If we are looking
at a French movie that was protected for twenty-eight years and then
not renewed, it previously enjoyed a limited term which lapsed.15 7
Resurrected protection for that work, to be valid, would seem to re-
quire a basis from some source outside of the Copyright Clause once
again.158
152. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
153. 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 18.06[C[2[d] (Matthew Bender, forthcoming Dec. 1995).
154. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
155. Congress's comerce power historically has been construed extremely broadly. See 1
Nimmer on Copyright § 1.09 (Matthew Bender, 1994). Ironically, soon after enactment of the
Act, the Supreme Court issued a ruling overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994 ed.), as beyond Congress's delegated commerce power. United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Although that precedent demonstrates that Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause is not infinite, it does not remotely threaten the viability of this
trade law, given how close to the core of economic activity the Uruguay Round Agreements lie.
156. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (see note 2 for the complete text).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994 ed.) ("Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on
January 1, 1978, shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date it was originally secured").
158. Professor Perlmutter defends 17 U.S.C. § 104A directly under the Copyright Clause.
Joint Hearings at 187-213 (cited in note 60). Conceding that "[if a work has fallen into the
public domain because its term of protection has expired, it would violate the 'limited times'
requirement to revive it," she nonetheless maintains that no such problems attend recapture of
works that lapsed due to formal defects. Id. at 206. That logic would appear problematic, as
Congress can extend copyright protection-it did so from 1962 through 1976, see 2 Nimmer on
Copyright § 9.01[C] (Matthew Bender, 1994); and in addition, a bill introduced shortly after
passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act would add twenty years to U.S. copyright
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Reverting to the bootlegging provision, it should be recalled
that protection thereunder is arguably perpetual. 159 We previously
encountered the Caruso example of protecting a work from a century
ago and for centuries into the future-that is the antithesis of "limited
[times." Again, it seems that this amendment must not be rooted in
the Copyright Clause to the United States Constitution.
This time, however, we could look to the treaty authority of the
United States Congress. For unlike the Rome Convention, the Berne
Convention was ratified by the Senate in 1989.160 The residual basis
of the Commerce Clause equally pertains in this context.
C. We Shall Be Released
One final constitutional issue: the release from warranties
and performance obligations. Recall that Congress forgives you for
those various things that you improvidently agreed to do in 1937 or in
1963 or in 1994, prior to implementation of the Act.1 1 A party like X
may have bargained in good faith and paid $5 million in consideration
and placed reliance on the promises of others. Congress has now
thrown those promises out the window. If this provision is constitu-
tional, then whatever due process concerns stood in the way have
been overborne by the supremacy of world trade. The same holds true
for the First Amendment concerns not addressed by the anti-bootleg-
ging features discussed above.162
The conclusion is that two centuries of rooting copyright en-
actments in the Copyright Clause now appears, from the present
perspective, to have been simply a phase. It is difficult indeed to
discern any limits here. If unfixed works can be protected perpetually
with something akin to copyright, then what conceivable implementa-
tion lies beyond Congress's powers? The affirmative grant of limited
protection to take advantage of a comparable extension in the European term of protection.
H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 16, 1995). See note 180 and accompanying text. If the
constitutionality is conceded of both extensions of term for subsisting works and of recapture of
works that lapsed for formal defects, it is difficult to conceptualize why the recapture of works
for newly extended terms is to be condemned. More consistent is the position that Congress
may extend subsisting copyrights but may not, under the Copyright Clause alone, revive
copyrights that were previously protected and entered the public domain for any reason.
Nimmer on Copyright, § 5.1 (Matthew Bender, 1967). See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966) ("Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available).
159. See Part 6.
160. See note 53.
161. See note 122-23.
162. See note 100.
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powers to Congress via the Copyright Clause is irrelevant because
vastly greater affirmative powers have been arrogated under the
commerce technique. Furthermore, the negative restraints on Con-
gress via the Due Process Clause and First Amendment, if a broad
interpretation of the new amendments is sustained, also do not effec-
tively constrain Congress from implementing whatever it will in the
copyright sphere.
X. THE MASTER CLASS
If copyright today is not rooted in the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, then what are the goals that copyright serves? Copy-
right, it seems, now has a new master. Rather than there being an
inherent value in serving "to promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts,"163 copyright has been transformed into an instrumental-
ity towards (what Congress perceives to be) a greater good. The or-
chestrator of that instrumentality, of course, is the law of trade. Be-
cause copyright now serves as an adjunct of trade, were my father
composing his treatise today, instead of in 1963,164 the most accurate
title he could choose would be Nimmer on the Implementation Within
the United States of Annex 1C to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization. Mired in notions of marketing and reader
recognition, the publisher has unaccountably refused to budge from
the current title, Nimmer on Copyright, notwithstanding that it has
become an anachronism.
This new master is indeed powerful.165 So powerful, in fact,
that in the world of trade, we must ask: who really cares about what
the United States Supreme Court has ruled in, for example, the "old"
(i.e., pre-WTO) cases of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.166 or Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.?167
163. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
164. Nimmer on Copyright (Matthew Bender, 1963).
165. Ralph Nader calls implementation of the WTO Agreement "trade fiber alles."
Committee Hearings at 351 (cited in note 36).
166. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
167. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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A. A Feisty Reappraisal
Turning first to Feist, the Supreme Court there construed the
limitation in the Copyright Clause that Congress could only protect
the 'Writings" of "Authors."'168 The Court concluded unanimously that
only something creative, evincing intellectual effort, qualifies as the
'Writings" of "Authors" under the Constitution.169 On that basis, the
decision ruled that telephone book white pages stand outside consti-
tutional protection.1 70
Now imagine that the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, which is established pursuant to
TRIPs, 171 votes in 1996 that copyright protection must extend to
telephone book white pages. 7 2 Would Congress hesitate to amend our
laws to bring them in conformity, lest we be bitten by a WTO panel
ruling? The precedent has already been set that the Constitution's
limitation to 'Writings" stands as no bar to augmenting protection
under Title 17, as proven by the new anti-bootlegging provision. Why
is a telephone book any further afield than a performance at Carnegie
Hall? Indeed, it is probably less afield, given the line of cases that
Feist overruled. 173 The accident that the Supreme Court has already
addressed the Feist fact pattern and has not yet addressed the
performance case is purely adventitious. One must postulate good
odds, therefore, that Congress would blindly follow suit and jettison
Feist to comply with the hypothetical Council vote.
B. Less Pretty Now
Turning now to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 74 the Supreme Court
inclined towards upholding as fair use 2 Live Crew's send-up of Roy
Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman."'17 That holding is very doubtful
to the mindframe of a copyright practitioner who matured, not under
our Anglo-American copyright system, but instead under a Continen-
tal system that reflects Berne Convention norms. The "mutilation" of
168. 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
169. Id. (citing 1 Nimmeron Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (Matthew Bender, 1990)).
170. Id. at 364.
171. TRIPs, Art. 68 (cited in note 16).
172. To the extent that the United States blocks the Council from adopting that construc-
tion, imagine instead that a WTO panel (to be discussed below) issues such a ruling.
173. 499 U.S. at 352-53.
174. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
175. Id. at 1179.
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the Orbison song, it seems to me, would probably violate the author's
integrity right under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.176
One must hasten to add that, by itself, a violation of Arti-
cle 6bis of the Berne Convention does not place the United States in
breach of international law because Article 6bis is explicitly excluded
from the obligations that the TRIPs protocol requires.17 Moral rights,
in other words, are not by their own terms incorporated into govern-
ing law by virtue of TRIPs. But, of course, that exclusion is not going
to stop a clever advocate arguing to a WTO panel. If one body of law
is unavailable, she will simply find an argument under another body
of law that is available. In this case, the clever advocate need not look
far. Article 9 of the Berne Convention, under one view, arguably
forbids the United States from following the interpretation embodied
in CampbellY7 The Dane, the Ghanaian, and the Peruvian who con-
stitute the hypothetical WTO panel invoked above might indeed be
persuaded that Article 9 of the Berne Convention forbids the Supreme
Court's Campbell construction.
If the exigencies of world trade so demand, why should Con-
gress scruple at that crossroad from altering United States law to
jettison Campbell and to get rid of that unfavorable gloss? In a world
governed by trade, in which copyright serves that master, no satisfac-
tory negative answer is apparent.
C. Judicial Comeuppance
Judge Hauk has a new boss too, as indeed does the entire fed-
eral judiciary. When I was a federal prosecutor, my office once suf-
fered dismissal of a criminal case under the Speedy Trial Act because
176. See Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works: 1886-1986 at 468-70 (Center for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 1987).
177. TRIPs, Art. 9(1) (cited in note 16). As stated by the then Register of Copyrights, "Ithe
United States has made clear to hostile negotiating partners that U.S. copyright owners will
abandon any proffered benefit in order to prevent any increased moral rights obligations under
Berne from becoming enforceable or even subject to toothless legal scrutiny. Period. End of
discussion." Ralph Oman, Berne Revision. The Continuing Drama, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop.,
Media & Enter. L. J. 139, 143 (1993).
178. See Paul Edward Geller, Can the GATT Incorporate Berne Whole?, 12 European Intell.
Prop. Rev. 423, 425 (1990) (stating that the "open-ended criteria of possible exceptions
[contained in Article 9] are... subject to conflicting interpretations"). For other examples, see
J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round. Competitive Prospects
for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 Fordham Inteil. Prop., Media
& Enter. L. J. 171, 224-35 (1993) (describing the application of TRIPs to borderline technolo-
gies). Professor Reichman counsels that the path of wisdom is to settle disputes rather than
force WTO panels to issue rulings under TRIPs. Id. at 262. Would that one could place one's
reliance on wise counsel prevailing.
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of delay. 179 It was a delay not caused by the government, but rather
caused by the district court's own schedule. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit, as I recall, affirmed that dismissal, stating that judges are
part of the government in the larger sense, and hence, the
"government" denied that criminal defendant his right to a speedy
trial.
The same dynamic exists today in the European Union. A
term harmonization directive currently requires all member states
throughout the European Union to lengthen their copyright terms and
mandates implementation no later than July 1, 1995.180 Italy and
other states have not legislated a change as of this writing. Imagine
that they delay and delay and still have not acted by the deadline. In
the view of some commentators, the European Court of Justice has
treated local courts as instruments of the member states'
governments, which are equally obligated to implement changes.18'
Therefore, the specter arises that the Italian courts could conceivably
be directed to change the law as part of the "government," even if the
Italian Parliament has not acted.
So positing that Judge Hauk has a new master merely applies
the same logic to this scenario. TRIPs mandates expeditious and
economical resolution of all intellectual property disputes. To quote
from the protocol itself: procedures must "not be unnecessarily com-
plicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted
delays."'182 Imagine that Judge Hauk in an international copyright
dispute takes a matter under submission for longer than the foreign
claimant likes, or that the claimant spends sums that it deems unduly
large in order to vindicate its rights before his court. Judge Hauk's
conduct in that case could form the basis of a WTO panel citation.
Just as American copyright proprietors do not care that the Indian
court system is bogged down and takes ten years to reach a resolu-
tion, so our foreign victim does not give a fig for whatever we care to
say about the United States legal structure. If ruled illegitimate by a
WTO panel, the pressure to institute changes will be powerful.
179. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994 ed.).
180. Council Directive 93/98 (Oct. 29, 1993).
181. Letter from Lisa M. Brownlee of Trenit6 Van Doorne, Amsterdam, to David Nimmer of
Irell & Manella, Los Angeles 4-6 (June 13, 1995) (on file with the Author) (explaining that the
European Court of Justice, in Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6, C-9/90
[1992] I.R.L.R. 84, "permitted a damage action against Italy for failing to timely implement a
directive which provided compensation for employees if their employer became insolvent").
182. TRIPs, Art. 41(2) (cited in note 16).
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If indeed the new master of copyright is the world of interna-
tional trade, if the events of last December are sustained in a broad
construction, then the Constitution must simply follow compliantly
behind. Copyright today serves not the needs of authors nor even the
popular good, whereby works are relegated to the public domain to
become the heritage of all humanity and copyright is simply a tempo-
rary way station to reward authors on the road to that greater good.
Instead of those goals, the balance of payments has become all-deci-
sive. Whatever bows to that god is now worthy of implementation.
L. FACING THE MUSIC
Where does this lead us in the future?18 3 What are the alterna-
tives? How can Congress resist WTO panel rulings,184 for instance, to
jettison the "bizarre" construction of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose l 5 as some
WTO panel might conceivably find in the future, or to micromanage
Judge Hauk's courtroom as another WTO panel could conceivably
order? A number of possibilities exist.
183. Copyright issues for the future may focus on universal digitization and
interconnectedness, with their potential for effortless copying and rendering the possibility of
enforcement chimerical, even more so than on trade. If trade threatens the end of copyright,
multimedia in the view of some will work its death. See, for example, John Perry Barlow, The
Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age
(Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is Wrong), Wired 84 (March, 1994) (arguing
that information is a life form that wants to be free); Esther Dyson, Intellectual Property on the
Net, Release 1.0 at 1 (Dec., 1995). See also Richard A. Lanham, The Electronic Word:
Democracy, Technology, and the Arts xii, 18-19, 134-35 (Chicago U., 1993) (noting that copyright
lawyers are "still trying to plot new epicycles on a Ptolemaic cosmos"). That subject matter is
pondered endlessly at the profusion of multimedia conferences that seem to characterize this
era. See, for example, Remarks of John Perry Barlow, "Digital World," Beverly Hills, June 5,
1991; Remarks of David Nimmer, "Euroforum Conference on the Music Industry," London,
December 8, 1994; Remarks of Robert Lucky, "Roundtable in Multimedia," Los Angeles, April 6,
1995.
TRIPs does not address this cutting-edge constellation of issues. See Ralph Oman, Berne
Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 139, 144 (1993)
(listing issues not dealt with by TRIPs). Nonetheless, one commentator saw the interconnect-
edness among copyright law, world trade, and the technological explosion of new media almost
two decades ago. Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne
Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 499, 553-54 (1967).
184. Note that rulings by a WTO panel do not constitute authoritative interpretations
binding on all the members. "Only the Members themselves (acting through the Ministerial
Conference or General Council) could adopt such an interpretation." Presidential
Memorandum, Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67263, 67294 (Dec. 20, 1993).
185. 113 S. Ct. 490 (1991).
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The first possibility is that the United States can successfully
play the role of the elephant in international trade.188 We are the
largest world trader, and could try to throw our weight around to
squash opponents. 187  Perhaps through a combination of diplomacy,
blandishments, and intimidation, the United States can use the new
world order to secure benefits from India, Korea, et al.188 She could
make them reform their own practices and court systems, while si-
multaneously resisting pressure from any WTO panel about what
goes on in the United States.189 Possibly.190
A second possibility is that the United States could simply
withdraw from the WTO and turn our backs on the last eight years of
efforts to implement TRIPs as the world's premier international trade
186. The United States "will not be outvoted by small nations in the developing world [as
they] will not jeopardize their export opportunities by antagonizing the largest economy in the
world..." House Debate at H11452 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Manzullo, Ill.).
187. On the other hand, some maintain that the structure of the WTO "will clearly stack
the deck against the United States, since most countries want unlimited access to the coveted
U.S. market." Senate Debate at S15304 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Exon, Neb.). See
House Debate at H11454 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Burton, Ind.) (claiming that the
U.S. will be outvoted in the WTO 122 to 1).
188. A problem afflicting previous enforcement of GATT sanctions was that only a handful
of countries adhered to the disciplines of the 1979 Tokyo Round; the bulk of the world, therefore,
was a "free rider" in this sphere. 58 Fed. Reg. at 67293 (cited in note 184).
Under the new regime, by contrast, increased market access for U.S. exports to such
developing countries as India, Brazil, and Malaysia is expected to result, as "there will be no
'free riders,' as has been the case in the past." House Report at 17 (cited in note 32).
189. Is this likely? Although the default under the WTO Agreement is decision-making by
consensus, absent the ability to arrive at such consensus, "the matter shall be decided by
voting." WTO Agreement, Art. IX(1) (cited in note 39). See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation
of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403, 2461 (1991) ("reaching consensus under the shadow of the vote is
altogether different from reaching it under the shadow of the veto'). "[Flor the first time in
history in an international organization with sanction-imposing powers the United States would
have no veto over any sanction imposed by a WTO panel." Committee Hearings at 293 (cited in
note 36) (remarks of Prof. Tribe).
190. See note 200. One Congressman quoted Prime Minister Hosokowa of Japan as stating
that the American usage of unilateral trade sanctions would be countered through the WTO.
House Debate at H11454 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Burton, Ind.). See Joel R.
Reidenberg, Trade, TRIPS and NAFTA, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Enter. L. J. 283, 284
(1993) (describing the difficulties associated with the United States' recent unilateral actions).
Congress registered its disagreement in the legislative history: "[The Uruguay Round
agreements do not amend or restrict the remedies available to the U.S. Government" to respond
unilaterally. Senate Report at 13 (cited in note 4). On May 16, 1995, the United States
announced imposition of 100% tariffs on 13 models of Japanese luxury automobiles, based on
perceived failures of Japan to allow market access to U.S. imports. James Gerstenzang, U.S.
Sets 100% Tax on Japan Luxury Cars in Trade Dispute, Los Angeles Times Al (May 17, 1995).
That conflict had been long brewing. See Committee Hearings at 23 (cited in note 36). Japan
vowed to challenge those unilateral sanctions before the WTO in Geneva. The day before the
sanctions were to take effect, however, both sides announced a resolution from their Geneva
negotiations. James Gerstenzang, U.S., Japan Reach Trade Pact on Cars, Los Angeles Times
Al (June 29, 1995) ("It may require the automotive trade equivalent of a Talmudic scholar to
determine whether the multiple elements of the agreement are being met in coming years').
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protocol. Indeed, there is an escape hatch built into the new legisla-
tion that says that if three WTO rulings bash us, essentially Congress
will reconsider and might decide to back out.'9' That would be a
rather disappointing culmination to years of American effort, to say
the least.
A third possibility is that we could thumb our nose at WTO
panel rulings.192 In that case, we would be open to cross-sectoral re-
taliation.193 The United States might refuse to accord copyright stan-
dards according to international norms as determined by the WTO,
for example, and the result would be that American wheat and rice,
for instance, would be subject to punitive tariffs in Japan and in other
countries. This does not sound like a very pleasant prospect.
A fourth possibility is that we could simply pay off the
aggrieved party.9 4 For instance, if Berne Convention National Q files
a WTO panel complaint and the United States is found to be in
violation, one possibility is that the United States could simply pay Q
off for the damages that Q suffers because of this trade status. The
problem is that once Q is compensated, M, N, 0, and P may line up in
the gravy train to get their share of payments from the United States
as tribute for not bringing their own DSU complaints. That too does
not sound very pleasant.
A fifth possibility is that we might suffer adverse WTO panel
rulings and simply decide to change the offending law or practice that
gave rise to the citation.1 5 Thence arose the scenarios of jettisoning
Campbell and Judge Hauk's autonomy invoked above. 96 The floor
191. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4833-34 (1994). "If
the WTO violated U.S. sovereignty three times in five years, any member of Congress could
introduce a resolution to have the U.S. pull out of the WTO. So, even if the worst fears of the
detractors of GATT come true, the U.S. will retain many opportunities to withdraw from the
system." House Debate at H11452 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Manzullo, Ind.). "After
the third bad WTO decision, Congress will vote on whether to withdraw from the WTO." Id. at
H11455 (remarks of Rep. Ballenger, N.C.) (discussing the "'three strikes and we're out' pro-
gram').
192. One industry spokesman criticized the U.S. Trade Representative for testifying before
Congress that the U.S. could ignore adverse WTO rulings: "If we can ignore it, 120 other
countries can ignore it, too, so you are absolutely nowhere." Committee Hearings at 123, 126-27
(cited in note 36) (remarks of Kevin Kearns, President, U.S. Business and Industrial Council).
193. Senate Debate at S15302 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Kempthorne, Idaho).
194. 58 Fed. Reg. at 67289, 67292 (cited in note 184). Sanctions include voluntary compen-
sation or suspension of concessions. DSU, Art. 22(1) (cited in note 39). As a legal matter,
payment of compensation may constitute only a stop-gap matter, not relieving the United States
of its obligation to change the offending law. See Committee Hearings at 210-11 (cited in note
36).
195. Senate Debate at S15302 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Kempthorne, Idaho)
(suggesting that "the certainty of trade retaliation or penalties will lead the [federal] Govern-
ment to pressure a state to change a law that the WTO considers an impediment to trade'.
196. See notes 172, 182 and accompanying text.
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statements from the Senate and the House contain innumerable
claims that the Uruguay Round Agreements exert no impact
whatsoever on United States sovereignty. 197 We will see in the future
whether there is any truth to those congressional protestations. As a
dry, technical matter, it is true that United States law is formally
determined by the national and state legislatures.198 But whether, as
a practical matter, we can resist the tidal wave' 99 that we have set in
motion remains to be seen.200
197. "GATT will not override any U.S. law. [It clearly states that no U.S. law can be
overridden by GATT. Period." House Debate at H11452 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep.
Manzullo, Ill.). 'That is pretty plain. It is pretty simple. They cannot overturn U.S. laws or
State laws in GATT." Senate Debate at S15295 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Nickles,
Okla.) (quoting Judge Bork's interpretation of GATT's effect on U.S. sovereignty). See House
Debate at H11457 (remarks of Rep. Hughes, N.J.); Senate Debate at S15301 (remarks of
Sen. Bingaman, N.J.).
198. The Senate Report provides that if a DSU panel,
were to determine that a particular Federal statute was inconsistent with any of the
Uruguay Round agreements, the Congress would retain full authority to determine
whether to amend, modify, or repeal that law. The panel or Appellate Body does not
have any authority to order the United States, or any other country, to change its laws,
regulations, or practices when those are found inconsistent with a Uruguay Round
agreement.
Senate Report at 13 (cited in note 4). Compare House Report at 55-61 (cited in note 32).
If an adverse decision is rendered against the United States under GATT, this does not
invalidate any Federal, State, or local laws. The result is rather that the successful
complaining country will be authorized to take retaliating [sic] action against us. Of
course any country has that same option at the present time.
Senate Debate at S15301 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Bingaman, N.M.).
199. It should be recalled that the old GATT mechanism allowed the offending country to
block implementation of a panel ruling. "Since historically the United States has brought more
cases to the GATT than any other country and we have seen many rulings favorable to the
United States be blocked, the WTO procedures could well work to our advantage." Senate
Debate at S15296 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini, Ariz.). That blockage no longer
pertains under the new system. Some claim that the United States will benefit from the
change. See House Debate at H11457 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Rep. Hughes, N.J.) (arguing
that the U.S. is "the largest exporter facing the most restraints'. Others disagree: "While [the
current] system has not worked well every time, it has preserved the U.S.'s ability to veto GATT
decisions contrary to our interests. Under the Uruguay round of GATT now before the Senate,
this veto power will be lost." Senate Debate at S15302 (remarks of Sen. Kempthorne, Idaho).
200. Yes, as the proponents preach and preach and preach again, only the United
States can change its laws in response to a WTO dispute resolution. But it must also be
said that only the WTO has the power to determine if another country is justified in im-
posing trade sanctions against the U.S. law. This they do not preach.
Senate Debate at S15304 (cited in note 81) (remarks of Sen. Exon, Neb.). Even more colorfully,
the Chair of a Senate Committee replied to one witness's claim that the United States "can still
act unilaterally" with the observation that "you can unilaterally cut your wife's throat and kill
her" given that the 'law of murder does not prevent you from doing it, but you have got to pay
the penalty." Committee Hearings at 140-42 (cited in note 36) (remarks of Sen. Hollings, S.C.).
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So where should we head from here? It seems that we are
moving headlong into the world of trade. I have sketched five possible
destinations where the current train of events may lead us. Undoubt-
edly, none that have been contemplated in this Essay will be the pre-
cise one to eventuate. Rather, the future will perforce be much, much
stranger than anything that any of us can imagine today. The one
thing that seems clear is that practitioners and scholars trained in
the discipline formerly called "copyright" will in the future be called
upon to answer ever more questions, which will increase geometri-
cally in complexity. Though old-fashioned copyright may have ended,
that new dynamic has already begun.
